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The emergence of new centres of power in Eurasia has entailed a re-reading of Zbigniew
Brzezinski’s book which drew an analogy between the Eurasian supercontinent and a
grand chessboard. Following the global ﬁnancial crisis of the last few years, countries like
China, Russia and India have started to project greater global political and economic in-
ﬂuence. Eventually, Eurasia has become a geopolitical symbol signifying a multipolar
world order unlike ﬁfteen years ago when Brzezinski wrote his book in a world dominated
by the US superpower. The changes in the geopolitical meaning of Eurasia have also been
very important for Turkey for a number of reasons. First, it is a country that is strategically
located at the meeting point of Europe and Asia. Second, its economy has grown at an
impressive rate throughout the 2000s turning it into a rising Eurasian power. Third, its
multi-dimensional foreign policy approach in the last decade has enabled it to develop
closer relations with the Eurasian states.
Copyright  2014, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In 1997, Zbigniew Brzezinski who once served as Pres-
ident Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor published
his seminal book The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy
and Its Geostrategic Imperativeswith the goal of formulating
a long-term strategy for US foreign policy in the post-Cold
War period. The central argument of the book was that the.
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nter, Hanyang University. ProdUS primacy in the world depended foremost on its success
in maintaining political, economic and military dominance
over the Eurasian supercontinent, which Brzezinski pre-
sumptuously depicted as “the chief geopolitical prize for
America”. Such a bold assertion, however, was actually
based on the self-conﬁdence of the US policymakers of the
period who boasted a strong political standing and
powerful economy at home and an unequalled political,
economic, military and cultural inﬂuence abroad in the
immediate aftermath of the Cold War.
Both the US power and prestige suffered a signiﬁcant
decline in the ﬁfteen years that followed the publication of
The Grand Chessboard. The September 11 attacks, two highly
controversial and protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
and ﬁnally the breaking out of a sweeping ﬁnancial crisis
have raised ever-increasing questions about the future
of US inﬂuence in world politics. The EU and Japan – the
two other leading power centres of the Western ﬁnancialuction and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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changes that took place in the global dynamics throughout
the 2000s. Around the same time, new actors have started
to become increasingly visible on the global scene. Four of
the “emerging economies” of the 1990s – Brazil, Russia,
India and China – in particular were included in a special
group called “the BRICs” due to their advanced economic
development. Not only are they expected to lead the world
economy by 2050, they also enjoy increasing inﬂuence in
world politics as they currently account for more than forty
percent of the world population.
Since the three members of the BRIC grouping are
geographically located in the supercontinent of Eurasia, the
policymakers and scholars have been compelled to recon-
sider the geostrategic signiﬁcance of Brzezinski’s “grand
chessboard” in the new millennium. This article seeks to
explore the changing meaning of Eurasia in world politics
by critically reviewing Brzezinski’s theory in light of the
new global changes. As the centre of gravity in the world
economy continues to shift from theWest to the East and as
the international system is becoming increasingly multi-
polar due to the rise of new powers, Eurasia seems to have
become identiﬁed with the idea of a geopolitical balance or
alternative against the West. Turkey is one of the countries
that is affected the most by this new geopolitical reality not
only because it is geographically located at the centre of the
Eurasian supercontinent, but also due to its decision
particularly in the last decade to develop its strategic re-
lations with the rising Eurasian powers. In this regard, the
article will also try to reveal the dynamics that have shaped
the Turkish governments’ geopolitical outlook towards
Eurasia in light of the current changes taking place in the
global political and economic balances.
2. Revisiting the grand chessboard: From unipolarity
to multipolarity
Eurasia is the landmass that shelters more than seventy
percent of the world’s population and covers almost one
tenth of the Earth’s surface. As a geographical term, it was
ﬁrst coined in late nineteenth century to deﬁne the super-
continent comprising Europe and Asia, which until that
period have been generally treated as two separate conti-
nents. In geopolitics, it has been associated with an even
more profound meaning as it is frequently referred to as the
symbol of land power against sea power. British geographer
Sir Halford J. Mackinder is probably the single most impor-
tant ﬁgure who conceptualized Eurasia in traditional
geopolitical thinking through his theory of the “Heartland” –
the northern-central part of Eurasia which he had initially
called the “geopolitical pivot of history” (Mackinder, 1904).
According to Mackinder, a state could only achieve world
hegemony by acquiring geopolitical control over the heart of
the Eurasian supercontinent (Mackinder, 1944: 113).
It is believed that Mackinder’s geopolitical vision greatly
inﬂuenced the world politics of the twentieth century,
since “the continuing struggle for Eurasianmastery was the
geopolitical essence of the First World War, the Second
World War, and the Cold War . [and] the Great Power
struggles of the twenty-ﬁrst century will likely repeat this
pattern” (Sempa, 2002: 20–21). This has also been themaintheme of Brzezinski’s book which likened the Eurasian
supercontinent to a “grand chessboard” – an immense
geopolitical stage over which the great powers continu-
ously fought for political and economic control (Brzezinski,
1997: xiv). Drawing heavy inspiration from the Heartland
theory, The Grand Chessboard has become a major inﬂuence
on the Western policymakers’ and scholars’ geopolitical
imagination of Eurasia in the following decade.
The novelty of Brzezinski’s book did not only lie in its
representation of Eurasia as a geopolitical battleﬁeld for the
world’s leading states, but also its powerful emphasis on
the emergence of the US as the most inﬂuential actor over
the political and economic balances of the supercontinent.
Brzezinski believed that the appearance of a number of
unprecedented conditions in the post-Cold War period
required a thorough reassessment of the geopolitical state
of world affairs. The most signiﬁcant condition he thought
was the rise of the US as the only comprehensive global
superpower that enjoyed clear supremacy in all four do-
mains of power (military, economic, technological and
cultural). For Brzezinski, this meant that for the ﬁrst time in
history a non-Eurasian power became the globally preem-
inent state and controlled the globe’s central arena
(Brzezinski, 1997: xiii). Viewing Eurasia as the “chief
geopolitical prize”, he seemed to be convinced that the end
of the ColdWar granted the US a huge advantage over other
powers to achieve political and economic domination over
the supercontinent (Brzezinski, 1997: 30).
It may be claimed that Brzezinski’s depiction of Eurasia
was at the same time greatly inﬂuenced by the theories of
“unipolarity” which were popular among the international
relations scholars of the immediate post-Cold War period.
Unipolarity, which refers to an international system where
a single state possesses capabilities that far exceed those of
any other state, was an academic response to the collapse of
the Soviet Union which left the US as the only superpower
in the world. Its principal exponent was political analyst
Charles Krauthammer who drew attention to the unipolar
character of the post-Cold War world politics and claimed
that the centre of global power became the unchallenged
superpower of the US (Krauthammer, 1990/91).
Although Krauthammer’s views were later criticized
by prominent international relations scholars including
Christopher Layne (1993), Kenneth Waltz (1993) and
Charles Kupchan (1998) who all thought unipolarity was
only temporary and would be sooner or later replaced
either by a bipolar or multipolar international system, the
US continued its unrivalled supremacy in world politics
throughout the 1990s, despite the presence of other
notable actors like China, Japan, and the EU. It is interesting
to view in this regard that even when political scientists
like Samuel Huntington took notice of these actors and
revised Krauthammer’s theory into something called
“unimultipolarity” at the turn of the millennium, they still
found it necessary to underline the superior position of the
US within the international system (Huntington, 1999: 36).
It was not until the second half of the 2000s that some
cardinal questions were raised about the sustainability of
the unipolar structure of world politics. Particularly after
2008, there has been an intensiﬁed debate about the
decline of the US primacy vis-à-vis the growing political,
1 The ﬁgure is when we adjust GDP growth for purchasing power.
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This does not mean that the US has become a secondary
power in the international system. On the contrary, it still
maintains its superiority in Brzezinski’s four domains of
power. For instance, it accounts for more than 40 percent of
the world’s military spending, produces approximately 20
percent of the global economic output, allocates greater
ﬁnances to research and development than other powers
and continues to exercise immense cultural inﬂuence all
around the world. However, it has also been facing serious
challenges since early 2000s. The highly controversial
policies implemented by the George W. Bush administra-
tion in the post-September 11 period, two very costly and
prolonged wars fought in Afghanistan and Iraq and ﬁnally
the global ﬁnancial turmoil of the last few years which is
considered by many as the worst economic crisis since the
Great Depression have raised serious doubts about the US
leadership in world politics.
On this last point, one should particularly recall the
warning of the British historian Paul Kennedy, who claimed
that “all of the major shifts in the world’s military-power
balance have followed alterations in the productive bal-
ances” (Kennedy, 1987: xiv). In this regard, one may expect
the current global ﬁnancial crisis to trigger signiﬁcant
changes in the military-strategic power map of the world.
Joseph Nye Jr., for example, draws attention to the ongoing
changes in the distribution of power in the international
system and indicates the emergence of a “three-dimen-
sional chess game” where he places military power in the
top board, economic power in the middle board and
transnational relations in the bottom board (Nye Jr., 2008:
58). Although the top board is still deﬁned by the unipolar
structure led by the US, Nye argues that there has been a
signiﬁcant trend towards multipolarity in the middle
board. The bottom boardwhich symbolizes the distribution
of power in the ﬁeld of transnational relations, on the other
hand, has already become widely dispersed between states
and non-state actors.
The middle board in Nye’s three-dimensional chess
game which determines the power relations in the eco-
nomic sphere have become quite ﬂuctuant due to the
striking changes that have been taking place in the global
economy since late 2007. In this sense, it is not only the
superpower of the US, but also the global economic inﬂu-
ence of the West that is being questioned. One should
particularly indicate theworseningﬁnancial situation in the
US, EU and Japan, which are sometimes called the mighty
“triad” of the Western ﬁnancial system (Amin, 2006). For
instance, only in 2009 the yearly industrial production
dropped 13 percent in the US, 38 percent in Japan, 29
percent in Germany and 13 percent in the UK (Germain,
2009: 673). The EU’s economic prospects became gloomy
after the Eurozone debt crisis and theUnion’s share inworld
GDP is expected to decline drastically by 2050 (Steinbock,
2012: 41). The picture is not much different for Japan as
the total value of its stock market collapsed by almost 75
percent in the last twenty years (Serfaty, 2011: 12).
As also indicated by several recent studies that attempt
to explain the changes in world politics under such catchy
names as the “rise of the rest” or “a world without the
West”, there seems to be a clear shift in the world economyfrom the West to the East (Barma, Ratner & Weber, 2007;
Zakaria, 2008b). It is important to underline in this regard
that the Asian share of global economy in terms of pur-
chasing power parity increased almost threefold in the last
thirty years. In fact, today Asia’s stock markets account for
32 percent of global market capitalization above both
Europe and the US (Herd, 2011: 14). As an indication of all
these remarkable changes, China ﬁnally surpassed Japan
and became the world’s second largest economy in 2010.
China is not the only actor that has beneﬁted from
the current shift in the world’s economic balances. As early
as 2003, the US-based Goldman and Sachs company
coined the acronym BRIC to refer to Brazil, Russia, India and
China – the four countries that were expected to overtake
the G-7 members and lead the world economy by 2050
(Wilson & Purushothaman, 2003). In 2001, the BRIC coun-
tries’ share in the global GDPwas around 17 percent. In only
ten years, this ﬁgure has increased to 25 percent despite the
negative impacts of the ﬁnancial turmoil (Müller, 2011:
1616).1 Their better performance in comparison with the
Western economies during the ﬁnancial crisis even
compelled the US National Intelligence Council to predict in
its report that the BRICs would soon take their place among
the world’s eight largest economies (Global Trends 2025,
2008: 7). Against this backdrop, the four BRIC countries
held their ﬁrst ofﬁcial summit meeting in 2009. Two years
later, they were joined by South Africa – a development
which changed the group’s name into the BRICS.
Apart from the formation of the BRICS, a major devel-
opment which strengthens the view that the world’s eco-
nomic axis is changing direction is the rising inﬂuence of
the G-20 mechanism which has greatly overshadowed the
G-7 and G-8 schemes in recent years. Although it was
established in 1999 as a forum for the ﬁnance ministers of
the advanced and emerging economies with the aim of
stabilising the global ﬁnancial markets in the aftermath of
the 1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis, the inﬂuence of the G-20
grew only very recently. In 2008, its meetings were turned
into summits of heads of states and governments. The 2009
summit at Pittsburgh was a turning point where the G-20
was afﬁrmed by the world’s leaders as the principal forum
for international economic cooperation. This can also be
regarded as theWestern leaders’ clear acknowledgement of
the rising inﬂuence of non-Western states in the world
economy. In Pittsburgh, the Western leaders also agreed to
shift at least ﬁve percent of quota share to emerging
economies at the expense of their own countries in the IMF
(G-20Ministers, 2010). A year later, theWorld Bank decided
to increase China’s voting rights in the organization. This
made China the third most inﬂuential voter, while the total
voting share of the emerging economies increased to
almost 47 percent within the World Bank voting system
(James, 2010).
3. Eurasia in a multipolar world
As a result of all these tectonic changes in the world
economy, the geopolitical meaning of Eurasia has also been
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as a grand chessboard which is dominated by a single non-
Eurasian superpower has become out of date in light of the
current geopolitical realities. In fact, in his latest book, even
Brzezinski confesses that the US wasted the opportunity to
“ﬁll the void created by the disappearance of the once
continentally dominant Sino-Soviet bloc” in Eurasia and
now “the task has to be undertaken in circumstances
considerably more challenging” for the US policymakers
(Brzezinski, 2012: 120–121). This is mainly because the
three BRIC countries which are at the same time considered
the new centres of global inﬂuence are located in the
Eurasian supercontinent. In parallel with their growing
global economic inﬂuence, China, India and Russia are
today playing a muchmore signiﬁcant role in the reshaping
of the political, economic and military balances in Eurasia.
They also enjoy close historical and cultural ties with the
other Eurasian countries which can be regarded as an
additional advantage in terms of their competition with
the US.
This geopolitical transformation is perhaps best re-
ﬂected in the emergence of new ideas that treat Eurasia as a
geopolitical counterbalance against the Western inﬂuence
in world politics. Most notably, in Russia and some other
former Soviet states the school of thought known as Neo-
Eurasianism attracted considerable attention in the last
decade due to its proposal for the formation of a kind of
anti-Western geopolitical alliance between the countries of
Eurasia (Dugin, 1997; Nazarbaev, 1997). In the ﬁeld of in-
ternational relations, in particular, the last few years wit-
nessed a signiﬁcant increase in the number of scholarly
works focussing on the rise of the Asian powers. It is no
coincidence in this regard that three of the most inﬂuential
works that elaborate on the shift of power in the interna-
tional system were published in 2008 when the Western
economies were plunged into serious ﬁnancial difﬁculties.
Journalist Fareed Zakaria, for example, perceived this shift
in light of the emergence of a “post-American world” in
which global power moved further away from the US
dominance (Zakaria, 2008a). Parag Khanna argued in a
similar fashion that the world’s superpower mapwas being
rebalanced towards three relatively equal centres of inﬂu-
ence based in Washington, Brussels and Beijing (Khanna,
2008). Singaporean academic Kishore Mahbubani, on the
other hand, not only drew attention to the rise of the East in
world politics, but also claimed this was a “peaceful rise”
that should also be welcomed by the Western countries
(Mahbubani, 2008).
All these intellectual endeavours are not detached from
the developments taking place in the practical foreign
policy sphere. One should particularly make reference to
the theory of “soft balancing” which became inﬂuential in
international relations studies in the 2000s due to its claim
that a number of secondary states are capable of balancing
a powerful state in the system through forming effective
diplomatic coalitions with one another (Pape, 2005; Paul,
2005). There have been many occasions in the last decade
where the rising Eurasian powers allied either with each
other or other states to oppose the US supremacy in world
politics. One of the most remarkable examples of such soft
balancing behaviour was the joint Franco-German-Russiandeclaration of 2003 that rejected the US invasion of Iraq.
Russia, in particular, effectively made use of soft balancing
instruments, most notably its permanent seat and veto
power in the UN Security Council which it frequently uti-
lized in order to form a diplomatic front with China. Thus,
the two countries achieved to block a number of Western
resolutions on such contentious issues as Kosovo and Iraq.
Most recently, they acted in concert in the prevention of
the UN from taking more effective action against Bashar
al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Furthermore, all ﬁve members
of the BRICS abstained in the March 2011 voting of the
Security Council resolution for imposing a no-ﬂy zone over
Libya.
Since the early 2000s, Russia and China have also been
improving their cooperation in the ﬁeld of security within
the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) which additionally includes the countries of Central
Asia asmembers and India, Pakistan,Mongolia, Afghanistan
and Iran as observers. Aside from the fact that it brings
together all major Eurasian states under the same roof, the
SCO has become increasingly prominent in world politics
due to its frequent calls for a multipolar world order.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, in particular, has been
one of the most outspoken advocates of multipolarity as
also indicated by his much publicized speech at the 2007
Munich Security Conference in which he harshly criticized
the unilateral policies of the US (Putin, 2007). The Eurasian
powers’ quest for amultipolarworldwas also evident in the
SCO and BRIC summits that were held back to back in June
2009 in the Russian city of Yekaterinburg which was
labelled as the “epicentre of world politics” by the Russian
leader Dmitry Medvedev (Medvedev, 2009). This is also an
important sign of the tightening institutional links between
the SCO and BRIC which together symbolize the growing
political and economic inﬂuence of the Eurasian states in
world politics.
4. Turkey and the new geopolitics of Eurasia
The remarkable changes that have been taking place in
the geopolitical setting of Eurasia in the post-2007 period
also had major implications for Turkish foreign policy.
Firstly, mainly due to its impressive economic growth in
the 2000s, Turkey itself became one of the “new powers” of
the world as also acknowledged by Western politicians
including the EU’s High Representative Catherine Ashton
(Ashton, 2010). In this regard, it is frequently associated
with the BRICS and other similar groupings as a country
that is expected to increase its global economic inﬂuence in
the next few decades (Welch, 2013). Secondly, the fact that
it acts as a natural bridge with its territories both in Asia
and Europe makes Turkey a truly Eurasian country.
Particularly in the post-Cold War period, this Eurasian
pillar of Turkish foreign policy became increasingly visible
due to the country’s geographical proximity to many sub-
regions of the Eurasian supercontinent. And ﬁnally, the
Turkish governments under the Justice and Development
Party (AKP) attached special importance to strengthening
Turkey’s bilateral relations with the rising Eurasian powers
like China, Russia and India. These three factors contrib-
uted to Turkey’s emergence as an inﬂuential actor on the
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century.
It may be argued that the continuous growth of its
economic power throughout the 2000s is the most signif-
icant factor that shapes Turkey’s prospects in Eurasia. It is
true that the country entered the decade with one of the
worst ﬁnancial crises of its history, which eventually paved
the way for the newly founded AKP’s rise to power in the
2002 general elections. However, the AKP governments’
adherence to tighter ﬁscal policies and facilitation of
Turkey’s EU membership process reversed this negative
situation. Eventually, during this period the Turkish econ-
omy grew ahead of many other countries at an average of
ﬁve percent. This credible economic performance helped
Turkey become the world’s seventeenth largest economy
and therefore a natural member of the G-20 platform. This
is also why it was included in the so-called Next Eleven
(N-11) group, which consists of the emerging economies
that are expected to play a substantial role in the world
economy along with the four BRIC countries (O’Neill,
Wilson, Purushothaman, & Stupnytska, 2005: 7).2
The fact that Turkey achieved to sustain impressive
growth rates in the 2010–2011 period at a time when both
the US and EU were dealing with serious difﬁculties
further contributed to its emergence as an inﬂuential
power in its neighbourhood. Another major contribution
to Turkey’s regional inﬂuence, however, came from the
AKP elites’ redeﬁnition of the country’s geopolitical iden-
tity in accordance with the views of Foreign Minister
Ahmet Davutoglu. Even before his appointment as foreign
minister in 2009, Davutoglu’s multilateral and multi-track
foreign policy vision that included the resolution of all
problems with neighbouring countries and strengthening
Turkey’s inﬂuence in regional and global issues was
already quite inﬂuential on the policies of the AKP gov-
ernments. Likewise, his seminal book Strategic Depth that
is based on the reassessment of traditional geopolitical
theories from the viewpoint of Turkey and underlines the
need for Turkish policymakers’ to reconcile with the
country’s Ottoman past and Muslim roots is generally
treated as a manifesto of the AKP’s foreign policy vision
(Davutoglu, 2001: 52–58).
Davutoglu’s personal interest in traditional geopolitical
theories and particularly his depiction of Turkey as a
“central country” in world politics inevitably highlighted
the Eurasian dimension of Turkish foreign policy. However,
one should note that his anticipation of Eurasia is quite
different from his predecessors who generally tended to
associate the regionwith Russia, Central Asia and Caucasus,
i.e. the former Soviet space. Davutoglu, in contrast,
frequently referred to Turkey “as a large country in the
midst of Afro-Eurasia’s vast landmass” (Davutoglu, 2008:
78). The addition of Africa into the geopolitical depiction of
Eurasia can be interpreted in two regards. First, “Afro-
Eurasia” strongly resembles the concept of the “world
island” (the supercontinent formed by Europe, Asia and
Africa), the geopolitical control of which was illustrated by2 Other than Turkey, the group included Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia,
Iran, Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines and Vietnam.Mackinder as a key for global domination (Mackinder,
1944: 113). In this sense, it may be claimed that by
placing Turkey right in the centre of this “world island”,
Davutoglu legitimizes his “central country” argument
which implies a much more signiﬁcant role for Turkey in
world politics. Second, the concept of “Afro-Eurasia” sug-
gests that the Middle East and North Africa are gaining
more importance in Turkish ofﬁcials’ geopolitical outlook
towards Eurasia. This is not very surprising especially when
one considers the AKP leaders’ traditional interest in the
Arab and Muslim world due to the strong religious and
cultural ties between Turkey and the countries of this re-
gion. As a matter of fact, the sharp deterioration of Turkey’s
relations with Israel in the 2009–2011 period, Prime Min-
ister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s rising personal proﬁle in the
Muslim countries due to his political support for the Pal-
estinian cause and Turkey’s active diplomatic efforts during
the so-called “Arab Spring” are usually regarded as signs of
the AKP ofﬁcials’ special interest in this region (also see
Altunıs¸ık & Martin, 2011). Another important sign is the
salient Turkish role in the Organization of Islamic Cooper-
ation (OIC) which is regarded as the leading institution for
international cooperation between the Muslim countries. It
should be indicated in this regard that since 2005, the OIC
has been led by a Secretary-General from Turkey.
On the other hand, one should note that the Middle East
is only one of the sub-regions of the Eurasian supercon-
tinent. Turkey, however, is regarded as a bridge or a passage
point between many of the Eurasian sub-regions. This is
also very clearly emphasized in Brzezinski’s illustration of
Eurasia where Turkey emerges as an important geopolitical
pivot that “stabilizes the Black Sea region, controls access
from it to the Mediterranean Sea, balances Russia in the
Caucasus, still offers an antidote to Muslim fundamen-
talism, and serves as the southern anchor for NATO”
(Brzezinski, 1997: 47). This very special geographical loca-
tion between three continents not only provides Turkey
with the opportunity to promote itself as a “central coun-
try” in world politics, but also helps it acquire multiple
geopolitical identities that continuously shape the geopo-
litical vision of the Turkish elites.
As also argued by some Turkish scholars, “the new
foreign policy places Turkey within various regions in such
a way that it occupies not only an important geo-political
position, but that it also would be able to emerge as a
meaningful player in political and economic settings” (Aras
& Fidan, 2009: 199). In geo-economic terms, the fact that
Turkey is located between the energy supplying countries
of Asia and energy consuming countries of Europe high-
lights the country’s new role as a major transit route for
various oil and natural gas pipelines. Thus, making Turkey
an “energy hub” or a terminal for pipelines running in the
East-West and North-South directions becomes a popular
slogan for Turkish policymakers since the end of the Cold
War. The commencement of a number of grand energy
transportation projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil
pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline and the
Blue Stream natural gas pipeline in the 2000s provided
further impetus to Turkey’s new geo-economic role in
Eurasia (_Is¸eri, 2010: 183–185). The most recent example is
the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) which is planned to
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Turkey to Europe.
Turkey’s geographical position also holds signiﬁcant
cultural implications in terms of Turkish policymakers’
outlook towards Eurasia. It is argued, for instance, that the
vision of Davutoglu represents “civilizational geopolitical
thinking” which emphasizes the religious differences not
only between Turkey and the West, but also some non-
Muslim countries like Armenia and Israel (Bilgin & Bilgiç,
2011: 180, 192). The same religious differences are at the
centre of Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis that
portrays Turkey as a “torn country” between the Western
and Islamic civilizations. On the other hand, Turkey’s
prominent role in the launch of the UN’s Alliance of Civili-
zations initiative in 2005 “which aims to improve under-
standing and cooperative relations among nations and
peoples across cultures and religions” shows that religion
does not necessarily play a factious role (United Nations
Alliance of Civilizations). This last point also suggests that
Turkey’s geographical signiﬁcance in the Eurasian super-
continent is based foremost on its capacity to link and
separate two opposite realms at the same time – whether it
be theEastandWest, Asia andEurope, IslamandChristianity.
It may be argued that this two-dimensional geo-cultural
identity is oneof themost inﬂuential factors that prompt the
Turkishgovernments to developamultidimensional foreign
policy approach which aims to strengthen traditional ties
with the West while forming new links with other regions
and states. Such an approach quite naturally contributes to
the signiﬁcance of rising Eurasian powers for Turkey in the
2000s. In fact, as also indicated by some scholars, onemight
even witness the emergence of “soft Euro-Asianism” in
Turkish foreign policy particularly in the second half of
2000s especially after a numberof problems started to block
Turkey’s EU membership process (Önis¸ & Yılmaz, 2009).
Most notably, relations with Russia improved at an un-
precedented speed and the two countries developed a
“multidimensional partnership” that is based on close po-
litical and economic cooperation. Today, Turkey and Russia
are top partners in trade and energy, the visa requirements
between the two countries have been removed for stays of
up to thirty days since 2010 and there is a high-level inter-
governmental Turkish–Russian council that meets on a
regular basis. All these developments make sharp contrast
to the pessimistic geopolitical conﬂict scenarios of the
previous decade which focussed on the two countries’
conﬂicting positions in many strategic issues in post-Soviet
Eurasia.3
Apart from the intensiﬁed cooperation with Russia, the
Eurasian dimension of Turkish foreign policy has also been
strengthened by the fresh impetus in Turkey’s relations
with China (Çolakoglu, 2013). The Turkish-Chinese
rapprochement is based on enhanced cooperation in
many ﬁelds including trade, nuclear energy, tourism and
logistics. The most remarkable sign of the new framework
of relations between the two countries has been the3 On the improvement of Turkish–Russian relations in the 2000s see
Aras, 2009; Özbay, 2011 and Ers¸en, 2011. On the impact of energy on
Turkish–Russian rapprochement see Kardas¸, 2011.increase of the bilateral trade from 10 billion dollars in
2006 to 24 billion dollars in only ﬁve years (Shi, 2012).
Another sign came in the sphere of cultural relations as
2012 was declared the China Culture Year in Turkey, while
2013 was celebrated as the Turkey Culture Year in China.
Most importantly, Turkish-Chinese cooperation became
noticeable also in the ﬁeld of military relations especially
when the air forces of the two countries held joint military
exercises in the Turkish city of Konya in 2010. These were
the ﬁrst such exercises that China held with a NATO
member state. The rising importance of Turkey in Chinese
foreign policy was also hinted by Turkey’s acceptance as a
dialogue partner in the SCO summit in 2012. Most recently,
the Turkish government decided to buy the missile defence
system produced by a Chinese company over rival Amer-
ican and European companies.
With India, the third Eurasian power that rose to
prominence in world politics in the last decade, the
achievements of Turkish foreign policy have been quite
modest due to the traditionally close relations between
Turkey and Pakistan (Özkan, 2010). However, the fact that
both Prime Minister Erdogan and President Abdullah Gül
paid signiﬁcant visits to India in the last ﬁve years has been
a sign of Turkey’s interest in upgrading its relations with
this country. At the same time, there has been a gradual
improvement in Turkish–Indian relations particularly in
the ﬁelds of tourism and trade. Regarding the former
sphere, Turkey started to implement a new visa policy in
2010 that aimed to attract more Indian tourists. In terms of
economic relations, Turkish–Indian trade volume has
signiﬁcantly increased from 1.8 billion dollars in 2007 to 7.7
billion dollars in 2011, although these ﬁgures are quite low
compared with Turkey’s trade volume with Russia and
China.4 On the other hand, Turkish economic ministry’s
latest decision to include India in its 2012–2013 list of
“target/prioritized countries” is expected to contribute to
better prospects for Turkish–Indian economic relations in
the following years.
5. Conclusion
Much has changed in world politics during the ﬁfteen
years that passed following the publication of Brzezinski’s
The Grand Chessboard. Although some may argue that the
Eurasian supercontinent still resembles a geopolitical
chessboard in world politics, they would ﬁnd it difﬁcult to
deny that the number of the main players in this chess
game has drastically increased. Especially during the course
of the global ﬁnancial crisis of the last few years, countries
like China, Russia and India – which are all located in the
Eurasian supercontinent – started to project greater global
political and economic inﬂuence at the expense of the
Western powers. This has also inevitably altered the
geopolitical representation of Eurasia in world politics.
Today, it is quite hard to imagine it as the ultimate geopo-
litical prize for America. On the contrary, the concept of4 In 2012, Turkey’s trade volume was around 33 billion dollars with
Russia and 24 billion dollars with China. These two countries are
currently among Turkey’s top three trade partners. For details see Foreign
Trade Statistics (2012).
E. Ers¸en / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014) 184–191190Eurasia has become a geopolitical symbol associated with
the rising powers and a multipolar world order.
The Turkish policymakers seem to have clearly antici-
pated the changing meaning of Eurasia in world politics.
Apart from the fact that Turkey itself was recently labelled
as a “rising Eurasian tiger”, its political and economic re-
lations with other Eurasian powers like Russia, China and
India also remarkably improved especially in the last few
years (Champion & Parkinson, 2011). Prime Minister Erdo-
gan even declared in a televised interview in January 2013
that Turkey could consider full membership in the SCO as a
reaction to its stalled EUmembership process. Although it is
currently difﬁcult to imagine the SCO as a strong alternative
for the EU or NATO in Turkish foreign policy, one should still
emphasize that Turkey is the only NATO member state to
enjoy a privileged institutional relationship with the SCO.
The dramatic shift that has been taking place in the
world economy since 2007 is also a very important factor
that shapes Turkey’s new outlook towards Eurasia.
Considering that the three members of BRIC are either full
members or observers in the SCO, it can be claimed that the
economic implications of the concept of Eurasia have
become much more important for Ankara in the last few
years. Particularly after the Eurozone debt crisis, it should
be noted that Turkey’s foreign trade with the SCO member
states has risen from 49 billion dollars in 2010 to 63 billion
dollars in 2012. The EU countries’ share in Turkey’s foreign
trade, on the other hand, has declined during the same
period (S¸anghay Bes¸lisi, 2013).
Despite the current political differences between Turkey
and the SCO member states regarding the Syrian civil war
and despite Ankara’s strengthened strategic relationship
with NATO in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the
Eurasiandimensionof Turkish foreignpolicywillmost likely
grow stronger for two main reasons. Firstly, the centre of
gravity in theworld economy continues to move away from
the West to the East. Turkish policymakers are fully aware
that they need to improve their political and economic re-
lations with rising powers like China and India in order to
continue their claim of making Turkey a central country in
world politics. It canbe claimed in this regard that groupings
such as the SCO and BRICS are perceived by the Turkish
policymakers as ameans rather than an end of realizing this
ambitious goal. Secondly, although the ﬁnancial crisis in
Europe has slowed, it is far from being completely under
control. This is another factor that complicates Turkey’s
already difﬁcult EU accession process. Yet if the Turkish
government and public completely lose their faith in the EU,
then a possible “Eurasian alternative” may seem more
promising–andperhapsevenmore convincing– for Turkish
foreign policy.
References
Amin, S. (2006). Beyond US hegemony? Assessing the prospects for a
multipolar world. London, New York: Zed Books.
Ashton, C. (February 6, 2010). Speech at the 46th Munich Security Confer-
ence. http://www.securityconference.de/Ashton-atherine.567.0.html?
&L¼1 Accessed 20.06.12.
Altunıs¸ık, M. B., & Martin, L. G. (2011). Making sense of Turkish foreign
policy in the Middle East under AKP. Turkish Studies, 12(4), 569–587.Aras, B. (2009). Turkey and the Russian Federation: an emerging multi-
dimensional partnership. SETA Policy Brief, 39.
Aras, B., & Fidan, H. (2009). Turkey and Eurasia: frontiers of a new
geographic imagination. New Perspectives on Turkey, 40, 195–217.
Barma, N., Ratner, E., & Weber, S. (2007). A world without the West. The
National Interest, 90, 23–30.
Bilgin, P., & Bilgiç, A. (2011). Turkey’s ‘new’ foreign policy toward Eurasia.
Eurasian Geography and Economics, 52(2), 173–195.
Brzezinski, Z. (1997). The grand chessboard: American primacy and its
geostrategic imperatives. New York: Basic Books.
Brzezinski, Z. (2012). Strategic vision: America and the crisis of global
power. New York: Basic Books.
Champion, M., & Parkinson, J. (July 1, 2011). Turkey’s economy surged 11%
in quarter. The Wall Street Journal. http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052702304584004576417073076740318.html Accessed
10.08.13.
Çolakoglu, S. (2013). Turkey-China relations: rising partnership. Ortadogu
Analiz, 5(52), 32–45.
Davutoglu, A. (2001). Stratejik derinlik. Istanbul: Küre.
Davutoglu, A. (2008). Turkey’s new foreign policy vision: an assessment
of 2007. Insight Turkey, 10(1), 77–96.
Dugin, A. (1997). Osnovy geopolitiki: geopoliticheskoe budushchee rossii.
Moskva: Arctogaia.
Ers¸en, E. (2011). Turkey and Russia: an emerging ‘strategic axis’ in Eura-
sia? Revue EurOrient, 35–36, 263–282.
Foreign Trade Statistics.(December 2012). http://www.tuik.gov.tr/
PreHaberBultenleri.do?id¼13428 Accessed 11.05.13.
G-20 ministers agree ‘historic’ reforms in IMF governance. IMF Survey
Magazine, (October 23, 2010). http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
survey/so/2010/new102310a.htm Accessed 07.07.13.
Germain, R. (2009). Financial order and world politics: crisis, change and
continuity. International Affairs, 85(4), 669–687.
Global trends 2025: A transformed world. (2008). Washington: US Gov-
ernment Printing Ofﬁce.
Herd, G. P. (2011). The global puzzle: Order in an age of primacy, power-
shifts and interdependence. Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy.
Huntington, S. P. (1999). The lonely superpower. Foreign Affairs, 78(2),
35–49.
_Is¸eri, E. (2010). Eurasian geopolitics and ﬁnancial crisis: transforming
Russian–Turkish relations from geopolitical rivalry to strategic
cooperation. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 12(2), 173–
186.
James, K. (April 25, 2010).EmergingEconomiesGrantedGreater Voice atWorld
Bank. Deutsche Welle. http://www.dw.de/emerging-economies-
granted-greater-voice-at-world-bank/a-5504672 Accessed 04.04.13.
Kardas¸, S¸. (2011). Turkey-Russia energy relations: the limits of forging
cooperation through economic interdependence. International Jour-
nal, 67(1), 81–100.
Kennedy, P. (1987). The rise and fall of the great powers: Economic change
and military conﬂict from 1500–2000. New York: Random House.
Khanna, P. (2008). The second world: Empires and inﬂuence in the new
global order. New York: Random House.
Krauthammer, C. (1990/91). The unipolar moment. Foreign Affairs, 70(1),
23–33.
Kupchan, C. A. (1998). After Pax Americana: benign power, regional
integration, and the sources of stable multipolarity. International
Security, 23(3), 40–79.
Layne, C. (1993). The unipolar illusion: why new great powers will rise.
International Security, 17(4), 5–51.
Mackinder, H. J. (1904). The geographical pivot of history. The Geograph-
ical Journal, 23(4), 421–444.
Mackinder, H. J. (1944). Democratic ideals and reality: A study in the politics
of reconstruction. Middlesex: Penguin Books.
Mahbubani, K. (2008). The new Asian hemisphere: The irresistible shift of
global power to the East. New York: Public Affairs.
Medvedev, D. (June 16, 2009). Vstupitel’noe slovo na zasedanii glav gosu-
darstv gruppy BRIK v uzkom sostave. Prezident Rossii http://news.
kremlin.ru/transcripts/4474 Accessed 21.02.13.
Müller, M. (2011). New kids on the block: the rise of the BRIC and the
reconﬁguration of global economic ties. European Researcher, 12,
1615–1625.
Nazarbaev, N. (1997). Evraziiskii soiuz: idei, praktika, perspektiva 1994–
1997. Moskva: Fond Sodeistviia Razvitiiu Sotsialnykh i Politicheskikh
Nauk.
Nye, J. S., Jr. (2008). Recovering American leadership. Survival, 50(1),
55–68.
O’Neill, J., Wilson, D., Purushothaman, R., & Stupnytska, A. (2005). How
solid are the BRICs?. Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper, 134.
E. Ers¸en / Journal of Eurasian Studies 5 (2014) 184–191 191Önis¸, Z., & Yılmaz, S¸. (2009). Between Europeanization and Euro-
Asianism: foreign policy activism in Turkey during the AKP era.
Turkish Studies, 10(1), 7–24.
Özkan,M. (2010).Cantheriseof ‘new’Turkeyleadtoa ‘new’era in India–Turkey
relations? IDSA Issue Brief. http://works.bepress.com/mehmetozkan/71
Accessed 12.01.13.
Özbay, F. (2011). The relations between Turkey and Russia in the 2000s.
Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, 16(3), 69–92.
Pape, R. (2005). Soft balancing against the United States. International
Security, 30(1), 7–45.
Paul, T. V. (2005). Soft balancing in the age of U.S. primacy. International
Security, 30(1), 46–71.
Putin, V. (February 10, 2007). Speech and the following discussion at the
Munich conference on security policy. President of Russia http://
archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912type
82914type82917type84779_118123.shtml Accessed 21.02.13.
Sempa, F. P. (2002). Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st century. New
Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers.
Serfaty, S. (2011). Moving into a Post-Western world. The Washington
Quarterly, 34(2), 7–23.Shi, Z. (February5,2012).Turkey–Chinareadytostrengthenalreadyclose ties.
Sunday’s Zaman. http://www.todayszaman.com/news-270495-turkey-
china-ready-to-strengthen-already-close-ties.html. Accesed 12.10.13.
Steinbock, D. (2012). The Eurozone debt crisis: prospects for Europe,
China, and the United States. American Foreign Policy Interests, 34(1),
34–42.
S¸anghay bes¸lisi ile ticaret artıyor. (February 9, 2013). Aktif Haber http://
www.aktifhaber.com/sanghay-beslisi-ile-ticaret-artiyor-733141h.htm
Accessed 10.08.13.
United Nations Alliance of Civilizations. http://www.unaoc.org/about.
Accessed 7.07.13.
Waltz, K. (1993). The emerging structure of international politics. Inter-
national Security, 18(2), 44–79.
Wilson, D., & Purushothaman, R. (2003). Dreaming with BRICs: the path to
2050. Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper, 99.
Welch, B. (2013). Just another BRIC in the wall? A comparison of recent
Brazilian and Turkish economic Developments. Insight Turkey, 15(3),
59–76.
Zakaria, F. (2008a). Post-American world. London: Allen Lane.
Zakaria, F. (May 12, 2008b). The Rise of the Rest. Newsweek.
